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5In Hans Christian Andersen’s fable The Emperor’s New Clothes, 
an emperor is swindled into buying 
a new wardrobe. The wardrobe, 
of course, does not really exist and 
the emperor appears publicly in the 
nude. He and his courtiers, convinced 
only the worthy can see the garments, 
are unwilling to admit they see 
wholly through the new clothes. In 
Andersen’s version, one young child 
loudly exclaimed the emperor was 
naked. In 2003, a similar drama – 
though with far greater consequences 
– played on the world stage. 
 In the lead-up to the invasion 
of Iraq, France and other states 
called out shrilly that they could see 
through the American case for war. 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, too, 
noticed early the United States’ case 
for war was built on a faulty premise, 
but he avoided the adversarial tones 
adopted by the French. Rather than 
publicly embarrass the Americans, 
Chrétien told President George W. 
Bush that Canada would support 
military action against Iraq if the 
United States  could convince 
the international community an 
invasion was necessary. By basing 
his test of support on overwhelming 
international approval – and not 
ruling out Canadian participation 
– Chrétien ensured Canada was a 
relevant player in the United Nations 
debate. When international approval 
had not been gained by the eve of war, 
the prime minister stood fast with the 
position he had communicated to 
both Bush and British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair in the late summer of 2002, 
and kept Canada out of the war.
 Shortly after 11 September 2001, 
Canadian ambassador to the United 
States Michael Kergin arrived in 
Ottawa to brief the government on 
the ramifications of the terrorist 
attacks. He described the Manichean 
worldview Washington had adopted 
in the wake of the attack, and warned 
Canada must be prepared to deal with 
a United States whose international 
outlook was coloured only in black 
and white. Although Afghanistan 
would undoubtedly be the first target 
of the American response, Kergin 
knew that American retaliation 
was not likely to be limited to one 
country.1 In the mean time, while 
Afghanistan was the only front in 
the response to the terrorist attacks, 
Canadian policy easily matched that 
expected by the Americans. Jean 
Chrétien honoured those killed in 
the attacks, publicly supported the 
United States at the United Nations 
and dispatched special operations 
forces, naval assets and later a battle 
group to Afghanistan.2
 As American and allied operations 
in Afghanistan began in earnest 
in the autumn of 2001, it became 
increasingly obvious that the United 
States was considering a second 
target.3 Soon after 11 September 2001, 
Canadian officials noticed American 
intelligence reports paying special 
attention to Iraq, isolating it from lists 
of other countries and noting Iraq’s 
failure to express sympathy with the 
Americans.4 Around the same time, 
Chrétien was alarmed by a television 
interview with United States Senator 
Jesse Helms calling for an invasion 
of Iraq. 5 It was not long before the 
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Abstract: In March 2003, Canada 
abstained from participating in the 
invasion of Iraq. Despite international 
pressure from Canada’s close allies, 
the United States and Great Britain, and 
against the urging of some domestic 
lobby groups and the Official Opposition, 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien chose not 
to provide military or political support for 
the invasion. Chrétien’s decision was a 
controversial one, but one made early 
in the crisis and before the outbreak of 
war. Although Canadian public opinion 
and the professional advice of Canadian 
diplomats and intelligence officials 
counselled against participation in 
the war, these arguments served only 
to buttress Chrétien’s initial negative 
reaction and his desire to work within 
the United Nations.
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6American press started reporting on 
intelligence leaks that linked Saddam 
Hussein to Al-Qaeda, and by January 
2002 Kergin was fielding questions 
from reporters curious if Canada 
would support an invasion of Iraq.6
 By August 2002, there was no 
doubt in Ottawa that the United States 
would target Iraq. Expanding the 
“War on Terror” beyond Afghanistan 
w a s  n o t  s o m e t h i n g  C a n a d a 
would agree to without careful 
consideration. On 14 August, Clerk 
of the Privy Council Alex Himelfarb 
sent Chrétien a memorandum stating 
bluntly: “U.S. action against Iraq 
to implement regime change is 
a question of when, not if, using 
the justification that the Iraqi 
government is a sponsor of terrorism 
and a developer of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).”7 Himelfarb 
noted the international community 
was deeply split on the issue, but 
the Canadian position “has centred 
on the return of UN arms inspectors 
to Iraq to resolve the disarmament 
question and to address the issues 
of terrorism when clear evidence is 
available.” The memorandum’s faith 
in the United Nations inspectors 
and disapproval of regime change 
captured the two main elements in 
Chrétien’s conception of the crisis.
 Only weeks after Himelfarb’s 
warning, Chrétien informed Blair 
and Bush of Canada’s position on 
war with Iraq. The prime minister’s 
comments to Bush and Blair would 
set the approach Canada would 
follow through the difficult months 
to come. While meeting with Blair 
in Johannesburg in early September, 
Chrétien expressed his discomfort 
with regime change in Iraq. He 
warned of the dangers of “getting 
in to the business of replacing 
leaders we don’t like” without 
being covered “under the flag of 
the UN.”8 No country, Chrétien told 
Blair, could invade Iraq without 
UN authorization. Clearly, Chrétien 
believed any military action would 
not simply be a continuation of 
United Nations pressure on Iraq to 
disarm, but part of a new American 
concept of national security that 
threatened to  undermine the 
international structures Canada had 
worked to create. 9 
 On 9 September 2002, less 
than a week after meeting with 
Blair, Chrétien and Bush met in 
Detroit to announce a new border 
agreement between Canada and 
the United States. By all accounts, 
the relationship between Chrétien 
and Bush was a friendly one with 
good personal chemistry aided by 
a mutual interest in baseball and 
golf.10 It was strange for all observers, 
however, when the two men opted 
to meet in private before their 
announcement, without the usual 
retinue of staffers to hear or record 
their conversation.11 After the half-
hour meeting, Chrétien de-briefed 
Kergin, telling him he had expressed 
concern over the impending invasion 
of Iraq. Chrétien had told Bush the 
international community would not 
accept an invasion of Iraq without 
credible evidence of weapons of mass 
destruction. Chrétien had also made 
clear the United Nations Security 
Council was extremely important to 
Canada, and Canada would require 
its approval to participate in a war.12 
Chrétien left the meeting highly 
sceptical of the American evidence 
for war, but still on good terms with 
Bush.13
 Chrétien’s comments in Detroit 
came to serve as the speaking points 
for the Canadian government. 
Kergin returned to Washington 
equipped with the prime minister’s 
position; from now on his standard 
response to any inquiries on Canada’s 
participation in an invasion would 
stress the importance of the Security 
Council. Across the Atlantic, Canada’s 
high commissioner to the United 
Kingdom, Mel Cappe, informed the 
British that Canada sought agreement 
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien 
salutes members of the US Border 
Patrol as President George W. Bush 
looks on after the two leaders watch 
a Free and Secure Trade “Fast” Lane 
demonstration, at the Ambassador’s 
Bridge, Fort Street Cargo Facility, 
in Detroit, 9 September 2002. Bush 
spent  the day making his case to 
Chrétien, who said the previous week 
he has yet to see evidence that would 
justify Canadian support for a military 
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7among the international community 
before military action, preferably 
through a Security Council Resolution 
at the United Nations.14 Deputy Prime 
Minister John Manley told the press 
that Canada had not “signed on” to 
“going in and changing the regime” 
in Iraq.15 Underlying this standard 
message, however, was the prime 
minister’s scepticism of American 
motives. Chrétien already assumed 
the goal of military intervention was 
regime change. Warnings from Paul 
Heinbecker, Canada’s ambassador 
to the United Nations, stressed a 
new American security strategy 
with emphasis on unilateral military 
intervention reinforced his concern.16
 Just days after the Detroit meeting, 
Bush appeared before the United 
Nations General Assembly and 
argued for increased international 
pressure on Iraq to ensure Saddam 
H u s s e i n  c o m p l i e d  w i t h  h i s 
obligations to disarm. A month 
later, in November 2002, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1441, 
declaring Iraq “in material breach 
of its obligations [to disarm]” and 
affording Iraq “a final opportunity 
to comply with its disarmament 
obligations.”17 The resolution was 
achieved by intense negotiation, and 
contained contradictory elements. 
It did not directly authorize the 
use of force, and the “serious 
consequences” threatened were 
variously interpreted. For those 
who interpreted the resolution as 
authorizing force, a lack of time 
limits resulted in further confusion.18 
In Britain, the ambiguity of 1441 
and the looming war caused a rift 
in the governing Labour caucus 
and a major crisis for Tony Blair. 
To assuage his critics and his party, 
Blair promised to seek a second, 
less ambiguous, resolution from the 
Security Council.19
 The confusion inherent in 1441, 
and Blair’s promise, led to further 
intense negotiations in New York. 
During the negotiations, Chrétien 
frequently called President Vincente 
Fox of Mexico and President Ricardo 
Lagos of Chile, both of whose nations 
were represented on the Security 
Council. Noticing the stress these 
men were facing, Chrétien remarked 
to Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill 
Graham that although Canada 
constantly sought a seat on the 
Security Council, holding a seat was 
a mixed blessing. At times like this, it 
would bring enormous pressure like 
that faced by Mexico and Chile. While 
free of the Security Council, Canada 
was able to operate at the United 
Nations with fewer constraints.20
 Despite not having a seat on the 
Council, Graham was in constant 
contact with his European and 
American colleagues; Dominique de 
Villepin of France, Javier Solana of 
the European Union, but much less 
with British Foreign Minister Jack 
Straw. Graham’s closest contact was 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, with 
whom Graham enjoyed a relationship 
that allowed for frank discussion. 
In December 2002, Graham told 
Powell that Canadians were trying 
to help the Americans obtain a new 
resolution. Powell said the Americans 
“really would rather not have your 
help.” Concerned by this, Graham 
told Powell that if the United States 
did not gain another resolution, 
“we’re not going to be there, other 
people won’t be there either, it won’t 
be good for the UN and in the end it 
won’t be good for you.”21
 A significant Canadian troop 
presence in Iraq was a moot point 
after a 9 January 2003 meeting 
in Washington between Defence 
Minister John McCallum and Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In the 
meeting, Rumsfeld made clear he 
was not seeking Canadian troops 
for Iraq, and preferred Canada 
focus on Afghanistan. Neither 
the Pentagon nor the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense intimated to 
the Canadian embassy they would 
require Canadian troops in Iraq, or 
that they were upset when Canada 
did not send troops. During a visit 
to Central Command Headquarters 
in Tampa, Florida, and in meetings 
with General Tommy Franks, Kergin 
never received a message Canada 
ought to be involved in the military 
component of the invasion.22 But to 
suggest, as Janice Gross Stein and 
Eugene Lang do, that Canada’s 
decision to commit almost two 
thousand troops to Afghanistan 
got Canada “off the hook in Iraq” 
misconstrues the American pressure 
on Canada in the lead up to war.23 
President George W. Bush addresses the 
UN General Assembly in New York City.
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8Although there was strong desire 
from elements in the Canadian 
military and Department of National 
Defence for Canada to participate 
in the invasion, it was the White 
House, not the Pentagon, who sought 
the Canadian flag and the political 
cover it granted an invasion.24 The 
decision to take a command rotation 
in Afghanistan alleviated none of 
the pressure on Canada to publicly 
support the legitimacy of an invasion 
of Iraq.
 Immediately following the 
Rumsfeld-McCallum meeting, 
McCallum announced Canada 
would participate if the United 
Nations granted approval for an 
invasion.25 If, on the other hand, UN 
authorization were not forthcoming, 
Canada would still have a choice to 
make. Chrétien quickly corrected 
McCallum, declaring: “on matters of 
peace and security, the international 
community must speak and act 
through the UN Security Council.”26 
The mild rebuke generated reports 
of divisions in Chrétien’s cabinet. 
Although the Cabinet frequently 
discussed Iraq, it was never a specific 
agenda item but instead was treated 
under “General Business.” Minister 
of the Environment David Anderson 
recalls that knowledge of the Middle 
East was slight in Cabinet, and 
even knowledge of the geography 
surrounding Iraq was limited. For 
some, the limited understanding of the 
region was coloured by information 
from the Israeli government, passed 
on by constituents with whom a 
minister or MP had reason to keep on 
friendly terms.27 Overall, the Cabinet 
was largely sceptical of war, and 
conversation concerned Canadian-
American relations, not Iraq itself. 
To differ with the Americans on an 
international issue was not in itself 
surprising or necessarily problematic, 
but the American rhetoric linking Iraq 
with the vital interests of the United 
States made this an exceptionally 
difficult situation.28 Two members 
of Cabinet, Manley and Secretary 
of State for International Financial 
Institutions Maurizio Bevilacqua, 
were later reported to have argued in 
favour of the war, fearing a political 
and economic backlash from the 
United States if Canada did not 
support its ally.29 
 Although no straw poll  or 
other count of opinion was taken 
in Cabinet, the prime minister did 
consult key cabinet ministers in 
private discussions. Ministers such as 
Graham and McCallum were asked 
to weigh in, as were Ambassadors 
Heinbecker and Kergin. The prime 
minister also kept the pulse of his 
parliamentary caucus, the views of 
which “were a significant factor in 
the final decision.”30 Many Liberal 
members  were responding to 
concerns of their constituents who 
collected signatures for petitions 
against the war. The caucus was 
nearly unanimous in opposition 
to war without the support of the 
United Nations, save one lone voice.31 
Top: Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs  Bill Graham (left) talking with US Secretary 
of State Colin Powell, 22 November 2002.
Bottom: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld escorts Canadian Minister of National 
Defence John McCallum into the Pentagon on 9 January 2003. The two defence leaders 
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9David Pratt, Liberal chairman of 
the Commons defence committee, 
argued that basing a Canadian 
decision on the will of the United 
Nations was an “abdication of 
national responsibility.”32
 Given the overwhelming support 
of caucus and Cabinet for Chrétien’s 
position, McCallum’s comments 
in early January did not reveal a 
rupture in government opinion. 
Instead, Chrétien’s correction of 
McCallum’s remarks demonstrates 
his carefully managed strategy of 
avoiding direct disagreement with 
the United States. The Canadians 
ensured, through careful choice of 
words in press conferences and in 
the House, that a door was left open 
for Canadian participation if the 
Security Council overwhelmingly 
approved a military action but a 
Russian or Chinese veto prohibited 
a resolution. 33 It is by this reasoning 
that Chrétien could argue Resolution 
1441 did not necessarily need to be 
augmented by another resolution 
to authorize an invasion, and that 
the Canadian position in 2003 was 
consistent with its 1999 participation 
in the NATO bombing of Serbia. 
The seeming discrepancy between 
the two situations was a point of 
criticism made by many, including 
American ambassador to Canada 
Paul Cellucci.34 David Anderson, 
who sat in the Cabinet during both 
the 1999 and 2003 decisions, notes 
the “difference was primarily that the 
international community was simply 
much more coherent on the Kosovo 
issue.”35 In early 2003, it was clear 
just how incoherent the international 
community had become.
 Towards the end of January, 
Blair called Chrétien to tell him a 
successive resolution was going 
to pass in the Security Council 
and Canada should lend it moral 
support. Paul Heinbecker, who was 
in frequent telephone contact with 
Chrétien from late January until mid-
March, told him Blair was wrong and 
the British and Americans would not 
get a second resolution authorizing 
war. Heinbecker, from New York, 
told Chrétien “People here just don’t 
believe they’ve made the case.”36
 On 30 January 2003, Bill Graham 
met with Colin Powell in Washington 
High in the mountains of Afghanistan, soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battlegroup disembark 
from a US Army CH-47D Chinook helicopter, 7 May 2002. They are involved in a Canadian-led mission to search the Tora Bora caves 
for Al-Qaeda materiel, documents and bodies, and then to destroy the caves to prevent Al-Qaeda fighters from operating in the region. 
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and was shown some of the evidence 
Powell would present to the Security 
Council the following week. In 
another frank discussion, Graham 
told Powell war would “be a terrible 
problem for the United States and for 
everybody.” Graham went on: 
as far as I can see your problem is 
going to be, if you go in there and 
it’s not universally accepted, you’re 
going to be an invader, and you 
think you’re going in as a liberator, 
but after you’ve been there a little 
while the people are going to hate 
you, and you’re going to get hated 
by everybody. You think it’s going 
to be a big love-in but you risk being 
perceived as an occupier. 37
Powell disagreed, saying “this will 
be all over quickly.” He told Graham 
a resolution was a good thing, but 
should be achieved before February. 
Graham, quick to see the implications 
of this remark, told Powell it sounded 
“like you’ve already made up your 
mind to go whether you get one or 
not. If you get it it’s a cover, if not, 
‘to hell with it,’ is sort of what you’re 
saying.” Powell did not reply, but his 
body language indicated to Graham 
he had understood the situation 
perfectly. In the press conference 
that followed, Graham insisted four 
times that Canada would want any 
war with Iraq to be sanctioned by 
the UN.38
 Graham’s repeated reference 
to the United Nations reflected 
Canadian public thinking on the 
issue. Two days after Graham’s 
meeting with Powell, an Ipsos-Reid 
poll found 36 percent of Canadians 
against war altogether, with 46 
percent supporting war only with 
United Nations backing. A mere 
10 percent of Canadians supported 
military action without the backing 
of the United Nations. The resistance 
of Canadians to any military action, 
UN-authorized or not, was strong 
nation-wide. In Quebec, 46 percent 
were against any military action. 35 
percent of Ontarians, 34 percent of 
Atlantic Canadians, 28 percent of 
British Columbians and 27 percent 
of those in Alberta Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan were against the war 
even if a Security Council resolution 
was obtained.39 Nonetheless, as 
evidenced by Graham’s comment 
in Washington, the government 
was willing, at least publicly, to 
entertain the idea of supporting 
an invasion with Security Council 
approval but without a resolution. 
For Cappe in London, it seemed that 
by remaining somewhat ambivalent 
and ambiguous, the Canadians 
forced the Americans to take them 
seriously as a potential partner. This 
ensured Canada would be listened 
to in New York and Washington 
while negotiations on a further UN 
resolution continued.40
 On January 27, Hans Blix updated 
the Security Council on the inspection 
of Iraq’s weapons programs. Blix, as 
the executive chairman of the United 
A high-level meeting of the UN Security Council took place on 5 February 2003 to 
hear a statement by US Secretary of State Colin Powell (shown here holding a model 
vial of anthrax). He briefed the council on his country’s evidence of the Iraqi weapons 
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Nations Monitoring, Verification, and 
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 
was tasked with verifying Iraq’s 
disarmament. He reported to the 
Council “Iraq appears not to have 
come to a genuine acceptance… 
of the disarmament which was 
demanded of it.” This rebuke had 
a double-edged effect, spurring 
the Iraqis to increase co-operation 
while the United States held up 
Blix’s comments as independent 
verification of their claims that 
Saddam would not disarm.41
 The next week, on 5 February, 
Powell appeared before the Council 
and presented a number of photos and 
sound recordings of the threat posed 
by Saddam. Powell’s presentation, 
according to Heinbecker, “was a 
load of crap, the best case that could 
be pieced together, but evidently 
full of problems and inconsistent in 
several cases with what the UN had 
reported from the ground.” 42 Photos 
of a fighter jet spraying poison gas 
were dated from the war against 
Iran. Satellite photos purporting to 
show chemical weapons sites, later 
disproved, were “pretty evidently 
bogus at the time,” while accounts 
of intercepted conversations were so 
unspecific “they could be taken to 
mean almost anything.” Heinbecker 
was astonished that this was the 
best the Americans had to offer, 
and felt few were persuaded. Due 
to the eminence of the presenter, the 
Council was packed with onlookers, 
some of whom took the opportunity 
afterwards to share their frustration. 
Heinbecker and the Egyptian 
ambassador to the United Nations 
had an opportunity to speak to 
Powell. The Egyptian ambassador 
warned the Americans that while 
the invasion might succeed easily 
the US could face decades of conflict 
in Iraq and centuries more to regain 
America’s reputation in the region. 
 Canadian officials had their own 
reason to question the intelligence 
presented by Powell. They had 
access to the same information, and 
had already found it wanting. In 
autumn 2002, Bush had offered to 
send intelligence experts to Ottawa 
to brief the prime minister, and 
later offered to come and brief 
Chrétien personally. Chrétien and 
his advisors agreed that it would be 
particularly uncomfortable to dispute 
the president’s evidence in person, 
and decided information should be 
passed to Canada through regular 
intelligence-sharing channels.
 Eddie Goldenberg,  always 
sceptical of intelligence, recalls that 
intelligence was not a factor in 
the Canadian decision on Iraq.43 
Intriguingly, however, it seems that 
Canadian intelligence officials made 
one of the most successful analyses 
of the Iraqi weapons program 
among Canada’s traditional allies. 
During the lead up to the war, the 
International Assessments Staff (IAS) 
in the Privy Council Office (PCO) 
served as the intelligence assessment 
branch for both Foreign Affairs and 
PCO. Through its established links 
with other intelligence communities, 
the IAS received large quantities 
of information on supposed Iraqi 
weapons programs, including the 
intelligence behind Tony Blair’s 
claim that Iraq had weapons of mass 
destruction that could be deployed 
in 45 minutes. The Canadians also 
received intelligence passed along 
from the Iraqi defector “Curveball,” 
the informant responsible for Colin 
Powell’s claims of mobile weapons 
production vehicles. Despite the 
amount of circumstantial or indirect 
intelligence reporting that suggested 
an active WMD program, the lack of 
any direct intelligence led the IAS to 
assess repeatedly that there was no 
evidence Iraq had an active WMD 
program, or had developed the 
necessary delivery capacity.44
 The Canadians came close to not 
receiving some of the intelligence at 
all. Some in the upper echelons of 
the Bush administration considered 
dropping Canada from the shared 
pool of information, wanting to 
restrict circulation to states that had 
guaranteed support to the Americans. 
The Canadian embassy worked 
hard to ensure this did not happen, 
arguing that Canada deserved access 
to the common pool due to their 
contribution in Afghanistan and their 
promise to help rebuild Iraq if war 
came.45
 Perhaps one of the most important 
pieces of intelligence collected by 
the Canadian government did not 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham 
and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien at a 
North Atlantic Council Meeting 
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concern the working of Saddam 
Hussein’s government, but the Bush 
administration. In the months before 
the war, the intelligence liaison 
officer at the Canadian embassy 
in Washington received regular 
briefings from the CIA, but was also 
made aware of frustrations in the 
American intelligence community. 
As a result, the Canadians were aware 
the CIA was under political pressure 
to produce information confirming 
Saddam Hussein’s arsenal, and knew 
a debate over the accuracy of the 
American intelligence was raging 
secretly in Washington.46
 Nonetheless, the Americans 
had presented their intelligence at 
the Security Council, and Powell 
was continuing efforts at the United 
Nations. In the week following 
Powell’s presentation to the Security 
Council, after a Cabinet meeting 
where the issue was discussed, 
Heinbecker and Assistant Deputy 
Minister James Wright discussed 
the situation in the hallway. Neither 
man liked having “to choose between 
our neighbour superpower and our 
foreign policy and the international 
community.”47 Heinbecker knew no 
compromise was possible between 
the hard positions of yes or no on 
war. But if the decision-making was 
elongated in time, with Iraq facing 
a set timeline and a simple pass or 
fail disarmament test, agreement 
might be reached at the Security 
Council. This was the next logical 
step in a series of resolutions that 
had increasingly turned up the heat 
on Iraq. The Canadian plan could 
assure the Americans “the diplomatic 
process wasn’t going to last forever, 
and the Europeans and the rest of the 
international community would have 
the assurance that it wasn’t going to 
be straight off to war.”48
 Chrétien backed Heinbecker’s 
plan, hoping “if we could get an 
extra six to eight weeks, the U.S. 
military strategists would have to 
delay their plans long enough to give 
everyone more time to work out a 
diplomatic solution.”49 To publicly 
clarify Canada’s position on the war, 
Chrétien delivered a speech to the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
on 13 February. He declared: “if 
it must come to war, I argue that 
the world should respond through 
the United Nations.” Chrétien 
commended Bush for approaching 
the United Nations in the fall of 
2002, and urged the United States 
not to give up on the world body. 
“The long-term interests of the 
United States,” suggested Chrétien, 
“will be better served by acting 
through the United Nations than by 
acting alone.”50 Chrétien followed 
up on his speech with calls to world 
leaders seeking their support for 
a compromise position at the UN 
– a compromise that could repair 
the valued multilateral institution 
torn asunder by its membership’s 
debate over the looming invasion. 
Two days after Chrétien’s speech, 
Canadians demonstrated loudly 
against the impending war. 100,000 
protesters took to the streets in 
Montreal, with protests in the tens of 
thousands occurring simultaneously 
in Vancouver, Toronto and Edmonton 
and ranging from the hundreds to 
the thousands in other provincial 
capitals.51
 On 19 February, Heinbecker 
brought the Canadian compromise 
position before the Security Council 
with a stirring speech. He reminded 
the Council of the many voices calling 
for peace around the world, but 
acknowledged important questions 
remained about Iraq’s weapons 
programs. He suggested the Security 
Council direct Hans Blix to establish 
a list of “key remaining disarmament 
tasks,” in order of urgency, and to 
present the list to Iraq with a deadline 
for compliance. While a failure 
to find common ground would 
have “profound consequences” for 
international peace and security and 
the future of the United Nations, he 
declared both the government and 
people of Canada believed a peaceful 
resolution remained possible. 52
 I n  t h e  d a y s  f o l l o w i n g 
Heinbecker’s speech, Graham took 
the floor in the House of Commons 
to explain Canada was working at 
the UN “to avert war by clarifying 
the situation.”53 Graham explained 
the two Canadian objectives: first, 
by suggesting a resolution with 
a timeframe, the international 
community could communicate to 
Saddam Hussein that his failure to 
comply could not drag on further. The 
second objective was to demonstrate 
to the international community a UN 
solution was possible and desirable.54
 Back at the United Nations, on 
24 February, Heinbecker circulated 
a discussion paper suggesting: 
“A defined process for a specific 
period of time to address the Iraq 
situation.”55 The proposal, explained 
Graham, was intended to “close 
the gap between the radical French 
position and that of the Americans.” 56 
The Americans, initially silent on the 
Canadian proposal, expressed their 
disapproval when it became obvious 
it would divert votes from a new 
American-drafted resolution.57 The 
next day the United States, United 
Kingdom and Spain introduced a 
draft resolution stating “Iraq has 
failed to take the final opportunity 
afforded to it in Resolution 1441.”58 
The draft was abandoned when it 
became clear it would not receive 
the necessary votes in the Security 
Council.
 From Ottawa, Prime Minister 
Chrétien maintained telephone 
contact with Lagos and Fox. Both 
were under pressure from the 
Americans to join the coalition, but 
both men told Chrétien that they 
would not participate if Canada 
would refuse as well.59 Decision time 
was looming for all nations involved. 
In the House of Commons on 25 
February, Chrétien said he expected 
“a vote before the second week of 
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March.”60 Chrétien told the House the 
best means of achieving peace was 
“working discreetly and effectively, 
as our ambassador to the United 
Nations is doing.” 
 Indeed, Heinbecker continued 
t o  w o r k  t h e  b a c k r o o m s  a n d 
corridors of the United Nations, 
seeking a compromise. On 11 March, 
Heinbecker once again was recognized 
to speak in the Security Council. He 
underscored the importance of the 
deliberations, proclaiming: “Peace 
and war hang in the balance.”61 
Heinbecker acknowledged the Iraqis 
had only co-operated as a result 
of outside pressure, but urged the 
Council to avoid creating “doubt 
as to whether war were indeed 
the last resort.” In addition to the 
threats to international security 
he had noted in February, he told 
the Council it risked undermining 
international law and the Security 
Council as an institution. Heinbecker 
reiterated his call for a clear list 
of disarmament objectives to be 
completed by Iraq before the Council 
took “all necessary means to force 
compliance.”62 Rather than six weeks, 
Heinbecker shortened the suggested 
deadline for Iraqi compliance to 
three weeks. By compromising on 
a resolution, Heinbecker told the 
Council, “disarmament of Iraq can 
be had without a shot being fired.”
 T h e  C a n a d i a n  d e l e g a t i o n 
opted not to put direct pressure 
on the Americans to accept the 
compromise, but instead attempted 
to persuade the Security Council as 
a whole. Heinbecker was sure the 
Americans would ignore a direct 
Canadian appeal that advised a 
compromise.63 The only chance was 
through the gathered strength of 
countries that agreed with Canada. 
Canada had recently served on the 
Security Council, and was familiar 
with its politics. They were able to 
generate some momentum for a 
compromise, helped particularly by 
the British delegation, frantic to reach 
a rapprochement between the French 
and American positions.64 Besides 
certain British officials, there were 
even “some Americans who hoped 
for compromise that might avoid a 
potentially fateful adventure that 
lacked international sanction.”65 
 The Canadian position might 
have succeeded by two means. If the 
French had accepted the compromise, 
the British would have had to accept 
and the Americans would have 
had to commit to the compromise 
or face war without the support of 
its closest ally. If Washington had 
agreed to the compromise, the French 
position would have lost all basis for 
complaint. 66 Heinbecker recalls, “it 
was actually a very good idea. The 
only thing wrong with it, of course, 
was that the Americans had made up 
their mind and wanted a war. War 
was not the final recourse for them.”67
 The Americans had also decided 
to adopt a rather undiplomatic 
approach towards those who 
disagreed with them at the United 
Nations. The US “hardball” approach 
resulted in the removal of the 
Mexican, Chilean and Costa Rican 
ambassadors and an attempt to have 
the German ambassador removed. 
The Americans also undertook 
a campaign against Heinbecker. 
Having been informed by Heinbecker 
that the Americans were complaining 
loudly about his actions, Chrétien 
responded in his own unique style. 
“You’re a big guy aren’t you?” 
Chrétien asked Heinbecker. “You 
know what big guys do, they just 
ignore that stuff.” 68
 Despite Chrétien’s backing, 
Heinbecker had little expectation of 
success. But the circumstances were 
so grave, and “the consequences of 
failure were such, that if you made 
a 100% effort on the 5% chance, you 
might find some traction.” 69 The 
Canadians were disappointed, but 
not surprised, when White House 
Spokesman Ari Fleischer dismissed 
the Canadian compromise, and 
a similar Chilean one, as being 
a “non-starter.”70 The Americans 
were careful not to appear too ham-
handed, however, and did not go 
far in opposing the Canadian idea 
publicly. It appeared to Kergin in 
Washington that the United States 
had taken a calculated look at the 
positions in the Security Council and 
had realized the French were too far 
committed to an anti-war position to 
agree to a resolution that allowed the 
possible use of force.71 The Americans 
anticipated correctly, and a lack of 
French support eliminated hope 
for the compromise.72 It is striking, 
however, that one of the results of the 
Canadian compromise position could 
have resulted in United Nations 
approval for war. This would have 
placed Chrétien in a much worse 
position, with a commitment to the 
United Nations process in direct 
opposition to Canadian public 
opinion and his own instincts.
 Four days after Heinbecker’s 
impassioned speech at the United 
Nations, the Canadian public once 
again took to the streets. On 15 March 
2003, large protests swept provincial 
capitals, Ottawa, and smaller cities. 
This time, over 200,000 protesters 
took to the street in Montreal, boosted 
by calls from the Quebec Federation 
of Labour urging its half-million 
strong membership to participate. 
In Vancouver, there were 10,000 
protesters, 5,000 in Toronto, 2,000 
in London, 1,500 in Ottawa, and 
hundreds in Edmonton, Winnipeg 
and Halifax. 73 
 Despite this outpouring of 
anti-war sentiment, the Canadian 
government never attributed any 
of its decisions to public opinion. 
According to David Anderson, 
demonstrations are only taken into 
account if they “confirm an existing 
position or are a real surprise.” When 
they do confirm a position, they are 
a political boon to a government. 74 
In the case of Iraq, the protests and 
public polling results demonstrated 
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to Chrétien and his Cabinet that 
Canadians were opposed to the war, 
and particularly so if military action 
was not sanctioned by the Security 
Council. But this only confirmed 
the position Chrétien had given 
Bush in September 2002. Indeed, the 
timing supports Eddie Goldenberg’s 
argument the decision was based on 
principle – not public opinion.75
 Although there were protests 
across the country in March, the largest 
demonstrations were in Quebec. The 
strong anti-war sentiment in Montreal 
has led the noted historian Jack 
Granatstein to greatly overestimate 
the role of Quebec public opinion in 
Chrétien’s decision not to participate 
in the invasion. For Granatstein, 
who views the decision as part of 
a larger historical trend of Quebec 
determining Canadian foreign and 
defence policy, the “key” to the Iraq 
decision “was Quebec’s vehement 
anti-war opinion.” For his part, Eddie 
Goldenberg remembers no reference 
to Quebec in his discussions on Iraq 
with the prime minister or with 
Cabinet, though it was well known 
where Quebeckers stood.76 And 
Quebeckers stood, largely, in support 
of the conclusions that Chretien had 
begun to draw in 2002. With Quebec 
public opinion aligned with the prime 
minister’s opinions, there was little 
need to discuss Quebec in Cabinet. As 
Quebec public opinion continued to 
support the government, there never 
came a time to consider the impact of 
a decision that might place Ottawa at 
odds with the province.77
 Certainly not all Canadians were 
against participation in a war with 
Iraq, and some loudly called for 
war. Business lobbyists, notably the 
Canadian Council of Chief Executives 
and the Canadian Manufacturers 
and Exporters Association of Canada 
were concerned that failure to 
comply with the United States would 
adversely affect their bottom line. 
Kergin doubted the likelihood of such 
punishment, believing Canadian-
American trade relations were the 
product of economic, rather than 
political, interests.78 Graham thought 
the business lobby was overreacting 
to possible US retaliation and failed 
to recognize war requires assent from 
the population. He refused to equate 
the decision for war with business 
transactions.79 Anderson found the 
business community’s behaviour 
just as abhorrent. He rejected the 
notion that commercial relations 
should impact a decision to go to war, 
refusing to measure loss of sales with 
loss of life. Furthermore, Anderson 
knew Canada had “a few cards up 
our sleeve” if the United States chose 
to punish Canada economically. 
Challenges to oil sands development 
Prime Minister Jean Chretien receives a standing ovation after defending the government’s stand on the war in Iraq in a speech in 
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projects, or decisions concerning 
pipelines and other energy facilities 
could get the Americans’ attention.80 
Overall, however, neither Kergin in 
Washington nor Anderson, Graham 
or Goldenberg in Ottawa saw serious 
evidence the Americans would 
retaliate. 
 The economic data confirms that 
there were no significant changes 
to Canada’s economic position vis-
à-vis the U.S. In 2003, Canada’s 
merchandise trade balance with the 
United States was at the lowest point 
of a decline begun in 2001. Following 
Canada’s refusal to join the invasion, 
the Canadian trade balance actually 
improved.81 American foreign direct 
investment in Canada, which had 
steadily increased since the 1990s, 
continued to grow after the Iraq 
invasion.82 After the war analysts 
including Rick Fawn speculated that 
by not joining the war Canada had 
foregone economic opportunities 
including a more conciliatory US 
position on softwood lumber.83 There 
is no evidence of such a quid pro quo 
being offered by the United States. 
Upon further analysis, Fawn later 
conceded that the trade statistics 
demonstrated “no serious politically 
motivated economic retaliation 
occurred.”84
 After months of diplomacy, 
the Americans and British clumsily 
abandoned the United Nations, 
forcing Canada to refuse to participate 
in the coming invasion. On 15 and 16 
March, while the leaders of Spain, 
Portugal, Britain and the United 
States met in the Azores, the British 
made a last unsuccessful effort to 
convince the Security Council to 
adopt a new resolution authorizing 
force. Hans Blix would later recall 
of March 16 that his inspection 
was operating at full strength, 
and “Iraq seemed determined to 
give [UNMOVIC] prompt access 
everywhere.” That day, he took a 
call from a United States diplomat 
urging the expeditious withdrawal 
of Blix’s inspectors from Iraq.85 War 
was imminent.
 The next day, on 17 March, a 
morning telephone call from the 
British government put a pointed 
request to Ottawa.86 The British 
call posed four questions to the 
government, asking whether Canada 
would provide political or military 
support for the invasion and if 
Canada would make its assistance 
public.87 
 Immediately, Heinbecker was 
telephoned in New York, and 
he reported no UN resolution 
authorizing the use of force would 
succeed.  Chrétien,  his  foreign 
policy advisor Claude Laverdure, 
Goldenberg and Heinbecker were all 
opposed to supporting an invasion.88 
In Chretien’s office, Goldenberg 
insisted the prime minister make his 
response in the House of Commons 
before informing Cellucci or any 
other foreign government. The 
A Sea King from HMCS Vancouver hovers over the merchant vessel MV Zakat, which has suffered a major engine breakdown. Despite 
the six-degree list to port, HMCS Vancouver’s boarding party took control of ship and crew, then conducted a thorough search. The 
Canadians found evidence of smuggling, including documents, communications and repair equipment, technical facilities and a full 
load of Iraqi oil. The Zakat was towed into the Arabian Gulf by HMCS Vancouver and handed over to other coalition forces for further 
investigation. HMCS Vancouver was conducting maritime interdiction operations in the north Arabian Sea as part of Operation 
APOLLO, Canada’s military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism.
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British and American delegations 
in Ottawa were informed at noon 
the prime minister would provide 
an answer to the British questions 
in the House around 1415 hours. 
By the time Chrétien spoke, the 
Cable News Network (CNN) had 
been informed by the Americans 
that breaking news was about to be 
made and carried Question Period 
live.89 Chrétien’s stood in the House 
and announced: “If military action 
proceeds without a new resolution of 
the Security Council, Canada will not 
participate.” His remarks were met 
with loud cheers and an ovation from 
his ministers and backbenchers – all 
live on American television.90 
 Over the next two days, Chrétien 
explained his position to the House, 
noting the issues that had concerned 
him in September 2002. Chrétien 
reminded Parliament he had “spoken 
very clearly that the position of 
changing of regimes in different 
countries is not a policy that is 
desirable any time.”91 He turned 
the focus back to weapons of mass 
destruction, arguing “Saddam 
Hussein was disarming…I am 
still of the view, given some more 
weeks, disarmament could have been 
achieved.” Overall, said Chrétien, 
“it is better not to have war as the 
first instance but as the last instance 
…[The Americans and British] had 
not made a case for the necessity of 
waging war on Iraq at this time.” 
 Still, the decision was not without 
significant risk. Days after Chrétien’s 
announcement, with the invasion 
underway, President of the Treasury 
Board Lucienne Robillard raised an 
ominous question in Cabinet: “What 
if [the Americans] find WMD?” No 
one could answer her question, and 
a tense wait followed Chrétien’s 
dec is ion to  absta in  f rom the 
US Army M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and personnel from the 1st Armored Division pose for 
a photo under the “Hands of Victory” in Ceremony Square, Baghdad, Iraq during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. The Hands of Victory monument was built at the end of the Iran-Iraq war and marks 
the entrance to a large parade ground in central Baghdad. The hand and arm are modelled after 
former dictator Saddam Hussein’s own and are surrounded with thousands of Iranian helmets 
taken from the battlefield. The swords are made from the guns of dead Iraqi soldiers, melted and 
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coalition.92 While the ground assault 
against Iraq unfolded rapidly with 
early success, the Canadian as well 
as French and German governments 
were uneasy. They continued to 
privately pressure the British on 
their claims of the reputed weapons 
of mass destruction.93 It would be 
months before the Canadians had the 
grim satisfaction of knowing they had 
made a wise choice.
 The raucous approval Chrétien 
received in the House pained 
Cellucci, who suffered “truly bitter 
disappointment” Canada did not 
join in the invasion.94 Cellucci had 
not taken care to cultivate close 
relationships with a broad cross-
section of officials in Ottawa, and 
isolated himself from senior Canadian 
political advisors. 95 He seems to have 
been convinced by some Canadian 
public servants that Canada would 
join the American invasion and either 
informed his masters of Canada’s 
likelihood of joining, or failed to 
suggest the possibility of Canada 
not joining. Either way, he looked 
foolish when Canada did not join the 
coalition, and he took his anger out on 
Graham during a “very cool” dinner 
at the Lester B. Pearson Building.96
 Although Stein and Lang claim 
the “Americans were more than a 
little surprised” by the Canadian 
decision, it had been clear to many 
in Washington that Canada would 
not participate barring Security 
Council approval. Kergin received 
stiff comments from administration 
officials and outright contemptuous 
remarks from Congressmen, but the 
American government was not taken 
by surprise.97 Chief of Staff Andrew 
Card told Chrétien “you told us 
right from the beginning what you 
intended to do…We should have 
believed you.”98
 The decision not to inform the 
Americans but instead to announce 
in the House of Commons – with 
the government caucus standing to 
loudly cheer the decision – created 
an undiplomatic spectacle in the 
House of Commons later regretted 
by some. Kergin, who believed the 
courtesy of a communiqué should 
have been extended to the United 
States, says the decision resulted 
in some unnecessary bad will. The 
difficulties derived more from a lack 
of acceptable practice, rather than 
from the substance of the decision.99 
Later comments from Chrétien and 
his staffers further distanced Bush 
from Chrétien. Bush cancelled a 
state visit planned for May 2003, 
and at the end of that month, Rice 
called Laverdure to tell him the two 
leaders’ relationship was “irreparably 
broken.”100
 Some in the Canadian business 
community were incensed by 
the decision not to support the 
Americans. Businessmen stopped 
Graham in airports, and none-too-
politely made clear their views on 
his decision. Provincial premiers 
Ralph Klein, Ernie Eves and Gordon 
Campbell were quick to criticize 
the Canadian policy, obviously 
concerned the decision would affect 
provincial economies. Neither was 
the federal cabinet opinion fully 
unanimous.101 Secretary of State for 
International Financial Institutions 
Maurizio Bevilacqua was furious with 
the government’s position, arguing 
that it was crazy to disagree with the 
United States.102 In the overwrought 
hyperbole of the House of Commons, 
Leader of the Opposition Stephen 
Harper compared the Canadian 
decision not to participate with the 
failure to confront Nazi Germany in 
the 1930’s.103
 Despite the overblown rhetoric of 
the government’s critics, Canadian-
American trade and diplomatic 
relations remained strong. Following 
the invasion,  Kergin directed 
Canadian consulates to undertake a 
major study to determine if anything 
had changed in US-Canadian 
business relations. Although some 
individual consumers made choices 
designed to spite Canada, including 
refusal to buy Canadian maple syrup, 
there was no large-scale punishment 
meted out and no major contracts 
lost. It was determined that there 
was no economic consequence to 
Canada’s decision. 104 At a speech 
by Graham to the Chicago Council 
of Foreign Relations in November 
2003, during the question and answer 
period, the audience suggested two 
reasons Canada was insulated from 
an economic backlash: first, Canada 
had made its decision without what 
was perceived as the self-righteous 
attitude of the French. Second, the 
American business community had 
significant investments in Canada 
and the notion that Americans could 
punish Canadian businesses without 
harming themselves was a chimera. 
It was clear to Graham that economic 
integration worked in Canada’s 
favour.105
 Graham and Powell continued 
to work closely on issues of joint 
importance, including Haiti and 
Afghanistan, and this cooperation 
softened any backlash at  the 
diplomatic level. In Washington, the 
Canadian Embassy was not sidelined 
from updates on the war after the 
invasion. Instead, senior Canadian 
diplomats were invited to attend 
briefings given by Rumsfeld to the 
“coalition of the willing” partners. 
Canadians received updates on 
Operation Iraqi Freedom until the war 
became increasingly complicated and 
Rumsfeld reduced the frequency of 
the meetings.106 None of the Canadian 
troops serving on exchange with the 
American, British and Australian 
forces were killed, and the uproar 
created by the Opposition in the 
prelude to war largely disappeared 
from memory.
 The prime minister’s appreciation 
of the situation, made so early, resulted 
from what his colleagues describe as 
an uncanny intuition. It stemmed 
from his ability to see through the 










Sayle - Iraq War REV.indd   13 1/24/2011   12:27:48 PM
13
: “But he has nothing on at all!” Canada and the Iraq War, 2003
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
18
States, to understand the Americans 
had not proven their case, but largely, 
Anderson suspects, because “it 
offended every nerve in his body.”107 
Both Graham and Anderson identify 
the unquantifiable “shrewdness” of 
Chrétien as the major factor behind 
his decision.108 Chrétien anticipated 
Canadian political opinion on the 
topic, but made his decision long 
before demonstrators had taken to 
the streets. He knew instinctively 
that the American evidence was 
insufficient to “convince any judge in 
a rural courthouse” before Canadian 
intelligence analysts came to the same 
conclusion.109 Most of all, Chrétien 
knew that the invasion of Iraq 
was not commensurate with the 
essence of the United Nations he 
considered a part of the Canadian 
identity. All the while, Chrétien and 
his diplomats worked to provide 
a dignified opportunity for the 
Americans to re-robe. They refused, 
of course, and suffered more than the 
embarrassment of exposure.
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